Showing posts with label NRC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NRC. Show all posts

Saturday, March 21, 2009

Dealing With Reactor Site Employee Sleep Depravation Issues

In an earlier article GNU brought to light a serious Worker Shortage within the nuclear industry that sees almost every employee suffering from Sleep Deprevation. A Google Search on sleeping guards brings up numerous examples of people sleeping on the job at these CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE locations. The NRC's solution...limit the time that an employee can work during any given week to 72 hours...unless a piece of paper claiming necessary exclusion from the rule is created. God forbid NRC scaled back the hours and ordered REACTOR SITES to restaff. As example, Entergy's Indian Point Reactors have cut their staffing by almost 50 percent, choosing to pay fewer workers more overtime to save on other benefits such as Health Care. Problem is, employees routinely working 72 hour weeks is a serious SAFETY/SECURITY risk. Somewhat tongue in cheek, might I suggest that Commissioner Lyons reach out to DARPA, see if he can feed some NRC Employees into their Preventing Sleep Deprivation Program.
http://www.darpa.mil/dso/archives/psd/index.htm

Program Manager: Dr. Amy Kruse

Preventing Sleep Deprivation LogoSleep deprivation is a fact of modern combat. Current operations depend upon the warfighter’s ability to function for extended periods of time without adequate sleep. The widespread operational demand for optimal performance in sleep-depriving conditions demonstrates the necessity for development of methods to safely combat sleep deprivation and to prevent the associated degradation of performance.

The goal of the Preventing Sleep Deprivation Program is to define and implement approaches to prevent the harmful effects of sleep deprivation, and to provide methods for recovery of function with particular emphasis on cognitive and psychomotor impairments. Among the approaches currently under investigation include novel pharmaceuticals that enhance neural transmission, nutraceuticals that promote neurogenesis, cognitive training, and devices such as transcranial magnetic stimulation. The approaches discovered in this program will greatly increase our soldiers’ ability to function more safely and effectively despite the prolonged wakefulness inherent in current operations.

http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2008/01/darpa-develops.html

DARPA Develops Brain Chemical to Replace Sleep

Serta_sheep_look_2As the line between science fiction and reality becomes increasingly blurry, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has always led the pack in terms of cool, weird, wacky and frightening innovations. This time Darpa-funded scientists have found a drug that eliminates sleepiness with a nasal spray of a key brain hormone. The spray has worked well in lab experiments, with no apparent side effects. The hope is that the hormone will serve as a promising sleep-replacement drug in humans.

The spray contains a naturally occurring brain hormone called orexin A. In tests, monkeys suffering from sleep deprivation were treated with the substance and were subsequently able to perform like well-rested monkeys on cognitive tests. Darpa is no doubt interested in the spray for it’s promise of keeping soldiers awake and alert during battle, but for those suffering from narcolepsy, the discovery may offers a potential treatment. Even those with less severe sleep disorders may be interested. According to the National Sleep Foundation, than 70 percent of Americans get less than the generally recommended eight hours of sleep per night and consequently suffer some type of sleep-deprivation symptoms.

DARPA Sets Tone for Technological Superiority

December 2006

By Lawrence P. Farrell Jr.

farrell

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England at a recent conference in the nation’s capital noted that the greatest long-term threat to America is not weapons of mass destruction, but rather the prospect of losing our strength in science and technology.

England’s observations are quite sobering, and remind us of the important role that science and technology play in the military superiority of our armed forces. Although technology is just one of a triad of key elements that are needed to maintain our edge on the battlefield — quality people is the primary component, in addition to first-class training.

Technology is America’s great strength and one that we cannot afford to lose. In this context, it is fitting to highlight the important contributions that the Defense Department makes to the nation in this critical realm. In fiscal year 2007, defense S&T remains fairly robust at $13.3 billion — this includes programs in basic research (6.1) and applied research (6.2 and 6.3). One issue of concern, however, is that S&T is only 17 percent of the entire defense RDT&E (research, development, testing and evaluation) budget. That 17 percent share is expected to decline.

The biggest share of the defense S&T budget — $3 billion — belongs to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

DARPA truly is on the leading edge of technology, and provides a winning model for how the government can achieve genuine innovation that also helps us win wars.


PRIMER-OPSEC (Operational Security) For Stake Holder Communities

The NRC is failing miserably in doing their job of protecting host communities from the potential risks of a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor. Setting aside the WATERED DOWN DBT they are relying upon, their hiding of it from the public is putting us at risk. Their refusal to educate us about OPSEC, their refusal to speak to Host Communities about SECURITY RELATED issues puts us at risk...in short, they are perpetuating stupidity, ruining opportunity to have the public in stake holder communities as their allies. To help compensate for their ignorance through arrogance, GNU has scoured the web and came across some great things at a NASA OPSEC site on security, and what you as a person living in the circle of death around Indian Point should know...who knows, studying our primer, visiting the links might help you one day report suspicious activity that saves us all.

The NRC is failing miserably in doing their job of protecting host communities from the potential risks of a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor. Setting aside the WATERED DOWN DBT they are relying upon, their hiding of it from the public is putting us at risk. Their refusal to educate us about OPSEC, their refusal to speak to Host Communities about SECURITY RELATED issues puts us at risk...in short, they are perpetuating stupidity, ruining opportunity to have the public in stake holder communities as their allies. To help compensate for their ignorance through arrogance, GNU has scoured the web and came across some great things at a NASA OPSEC site on security, and what you as a person living in the circle of death around Indian Point should know...who knows, staking our primer, visiting the links might help you one day report suspicious activity that saves us all.
imageProtecting
Sensitive

Protecting Sensitive Unclassified Information


Overview

The term sensitive unclassified information as used here is an informal designation applicable to all those types and forms of information that, by law or regulation, require some form of protection but are outside the formal system for classifying national security information.1 As a general rule, all such information may be exempt from release to the public under the Freedom of Information Act. This module reviews the most common types of sensitive unclassified information.2 Again, this is a designation being used far to frequently just because certain people want the general public kept in the dark...Transparancy is a good thing.

Department of Defense also uses the term Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to refer to certain types of sensitive information within DoD that require controls and protective measures. CUI includes For Official Use Only and information with comparable designations that is received from other agencies, DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, "Sensitive Information" as defined in the Computer Security Act of 1987, and DoD technical data.3

Some information that is not formally designated as sensitive is nonetheless inappropriate for putting on a public Internet site. This is discussed in Pre-Publication Review of Public Web Site Content.

Most categories of sensitive unclassified information are defined by federal law, while others such as For Official Use Only are defined by organization policy and some government organizations use different names for this category of information. Most legislative authorities are very specific in identifying the protected category of information, while others are general and leave much discretion to the agency or company.

Procedures for safeguarding sensitive unclassified information depend upon the category of information and, in some cases, vary from one agency or company to another.

Personal Conduct and
Reporting Requirements

Standards of Personal Conduct
What is expected of me? Examples of behavior of potential security concern. Guidelines for adjudicating security clearances.

Self-Reporting on Your Personal Activities
Reporting foreign contacts, foreign travel, intent to marry or cohabitate, financial and substance abuse issues, certain outside activities, etc. Pre-publication review. Reporting foreign intelligence activities.

Reporting Improper, Unreliable, or Suspicious Behavior
Reporting responsibilities. Counterintelligence indicators. Security and suitability issues. Preventing violence. No good excuses for not reporting. Examples of how people like you made a difference. Hot line phone numbers.

U.S. Government Ethics Standards
Gifts. Frequent Flyer Benefits. Impartiality. Misuse of Position. Financial Interests. Outside Activities. Post-Employment Limitations.

Foreign Threats
To Protected Information

Who's Doing What to Whom?
Economic collection and industrial espionage. Illegal technology transfer. Computer crime. National Security Threat List. Militarily Critical Technologies List. Economic Espionage Act of 1996.

How Do I Know When I'm Being Targeted and Assessed?
Recognizing the spotting - assessment - recruitment process used by all intelligence services. Who is most likely to be targeted.

Getting Information Out of Honest People Like Me
Elicitation. Unsolicited requests. False pretenses. Short-term foreign visitors. Long-term foreign visitors. Joint ventures/foreign acquisitions. Open source collection. Theft and dumpster diving.

Risks During Foreign Travel
Country threat updates. Security and safety recommendations. Avoiding/recognizing intelligence interest. Contact with foreign relatives. Vulnerability to theft, bugging, communications intercept. Reporting security incidents. What to do if arrested.

Antiterrorism and Force Protection
Living and traveling outside the U.S. Defensive driving overseas. Package and letter bombs. Kidnapping and hostage survival guidelines. Hijacking survival guidelines. DOD Code of Conduct.

Computer and Other
Technical Vulnerabilities

Computer Vulnerabilities
Threats to computer security, how hackers work, and how we unintentionally make it easy for them. Passwords, "social engineering," case studies, using the Internet securely, e-mail, viruses, security of hard drives, theft of laptop computers.

Intercepting Your Communications
Telephones, fax machines, cell phones, cordless phones, answering machines, voice mail, intercoms and baby monitors, countermeasures.

Bugs and Other Eavesdropping Devices
Eavesdropping threat. Methods of eavesdropping. Detecting and Preventing Eavesdropping.

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Reporting Improper, Unreliable, & Suspicious Behavior

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Reporting Responsibilities

If you are entrusted with safeguarding classified material, you are expected to report potentially significant, factual information that comes to your attention and that raises potential security concerns about a co-worker. You are also strongly encouraged to help co-workers who are having personal problems that may become a security issue if the problems are not addressed.

Presidential Executive Order 12968 on "Access to Classified Information" states: "Employees are encouraged and expected to report any information that raises doubts as to whether another employee's continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security." It states further that the head of each agency that grants access to classified information shall establish a program to educate employees with access to classified information about their individual responsibilities under this order.1 This security guide meets that requirement.

The information presented under Counterintelligence Indicators, Security and Suitability Issues, Preventing Violence, and Suicide Crisis Intervention is background information to help you judge whether a co-worker’s behavior raises concerns that merit reporting to an appropriate authority.

Related Topics: Exploring the Mind of the Spy, Treason 101, Spy Stories

Reference
1. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/4 also imposes an "obligation to report to proper authorities any information which could reflect on the trustworthiness of an individual who has access to SCI."

imageTreason 101

Treason 101

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Overview

Your short course in Treason is a series of articles on how spies are caught, the prevalence of espionage, and why people spy.

It starts with a short piece on How Spies Are Caught. That comes first, as it is so important for anyone who may be considering espionage to understand that they WILL be caught. Perhaps not right away, but eventually. The statute of limitations does not apply to the crime of espionage. Anyone who commits this crime will have to be looking over their shoulder for the rest of their life.

The Insider Espionage Threat identifies four conditions that must exist before espionage occurs – opportunity to commit the crime; motive; ability to overcome inhibitions such as moral values, fear of being caught, and loyalty to employer or co-workers; and a trigger that sets the betrayal in motion. The article then analyzes how these pre-conditions for betrayal are increasing as a result of changes in social and economic conditions in the United States, and in our relations with the rest of the world.

Explosive growth in information technology is increasing exponentially the amount of information that can be collected and compromised by a single, well-placed spy. Insider Threat to Information Systems examines some of the unique security issues associated with computer professionals.

Exploring the Mind of the Spy discusses what psychologists have learned by interviewing and testing arrested and convicted American spies. Motivations for espionage are far more complex than commonly believed. Selling secrets is usually the last act of a long-simmering emotional crisis. In many cases, the symptoms of this crisis have been observable, identifiable, and even treatable before the damage was done. Typically, however, the potential significance of the "at-risk" behavior has not been recognized or reported at the time by coworkers or supervisors.

Espionage by the Numbers describes an unclassified database on all Americans arrested for espionage since the start of the Cold War. Based on media reports, trial records and unclassified official documents, the data base records information characteristics of the spies, characteristics of the espionage activity, and prevalence among the spies of several behaviors that are commonly associated with security risk.

Counterintelligenceimage - fish
If a story smells fishy, it probably is fishy!

Counterintelligence Indicators

Counterintelligence indicators are signs that an individual may already be involved in espionage or other improper use of classified information. The record of past espionage cases shows that co-workers and supervisors often overlooked or failed to report counterintelligence indicators which, had they been reported, would have permitted earlier detection of the spy.

Some of the following indicators are clear evidence of improper behavior. Others may well have an innocent explanation but are sufficiently noteworthy that your security office should be informed. If you become aware that any of the following indicators apply to one of your co-workers, you are expected to report this information directly to your security office or a counterintelligence office, or by calling any one of the Hotline Numbers that various organizations have set up for this purpose.

The security office will evaluate the information in the context of all other information known about the individual. Depending upon the circumstances, action may range from simply making a note in the individual's security file to conducting a discrete investigation.

If your reporting helps stop a case of espionage, you may be eligible for a reward of up to $500,000. The reward is authorized by an amendment to Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3071, which authorizes the Attorney General to make payment for information on espionage activity in any country which leads to the arrest and conviction of any person(s):

  • For commission of an act of espionage against the United States.
  • For conspiring or attempting to commit an act of espionage against the United States
  • Or which leads to the prevention or frustration of an act of espionage against the United States.

Reportable Indicators

bullet Indicators of Potential Motivation

  • Disgruntlement with one's employer or the U.S. Government strong enough to make the individual desire revenge.
  • Any statement that, considering who made the statement and under what circumstances, suggests potential conflicting loyalties that may affect handling of classified or other protected information
  • Active attempt to encourage military or civilian personnel to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities.
  • Knowing membership in, or attempt to conceal membership in, any group which: 1) advocates the use of force or violence to cause political change within the U.S., 2) has been identified as a front group for foreign interests, or 3) advocates loyalty to a foreign interest.
  • Repeated statements or actions indicating an abnormal fascination with and strong desire to engage in "spy" work. Fantasies of oneself as a James Bond.

bullet Potential Indicators of Information Collection

  • Asking others to obtain or facilitate access to classified or unclassified but protected information to which one does not have authorized access.
  • Obtaining or attempting to obtain a witness signature on a classified document destruction record when the witness did not observe the destruction.
  • Offering extra income from an outside activity to a person with a sensitive job, in an apparent attempt to entice that person into some unspecified illegal activity.
  • Undue curiosity or requests for information about matters not within the scope of the individual’s job or need-to-know.
  • Unauthorized removal or attempts to remove classified, export-controlled, proprietary or other protected material from the work area.
  • Retention of classified, export-controlled, proprietary, or other sensitive information obtained at a previous employment without the authorization or the knowledge of that employer.
  • Extensive use of copy, facsimile, or computer equipment to reproduce or transmit classified, sensitive, or proprietary material which may exceed job requirements.

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  • Taking classified materials home or on trips, purportedly for work reasons, without proper authorization.
  • Working odd hours when others are not in the office without a logical reason, or visiting work areas after normal hours for no logical reason.
  • Bringing cameras or recording devices, without approval, into areas storing classified or other protected material.

bullet Potential Indicators of Information Transmittal

  • Storing classified material at home or any other unauthorized place.
  • Short trips to foreign countries, or within the U.S. to cities with foreign diplomatic facilities, for unusual or unexplained reasons, or that are inconsistent with one’s apparent interests and financial means.
  • Excessive and/or unexplained use of e-mail or fax.
  • Failure to comply with regulations for reporting foreign contacts or foreign travel. Any attempt to conceal foreign travel or to conceal close and continuing contact with a foreigner, particularly a foreign official.
  • Foreign travel not reflected in the individual’s passport to countries where entries would normally be stamped.
  • Maintaining ongoing personal contact, without prior approval, with diplomatic or other representatives from countries with which one has ethnic, religious, cultural or other emotional ties or obligations, or with employees of competing companies in those countries.

bullet Potential Indicators of Illegal Income

  • Unexplained affluence, or life-style inconsistent with known income. Includes sudden purchase of high-value items or unusually frequent personal travel which appears to be beyond known income. Sudden repayment of large debts or loans, indicating sudden reversal of financial difficulties.
  • Joking or bragging about working for a foreign intelligence service, or having a mysterious source of income.

bullet Other Potential Indicators

  • Behavior indicating concern that one is being investigated or watched, such as actions to detect physical surveillance, searching for listening devices or cameras, and leaving "traps" to detect search of the individual’s work area or home.
  • Any part-time employment or other outside activity that may create a conflict of interest with one's obligation to protect classified or other sensitive information, and that has not been approved by the security office.
  • Attempt to conceal any activity covered by one of these counterintelligence indicators.

Friday, March 20, 2009

NRC Commissioners Again Choose Licensee's Over Human Health and Safety In Refusing to Strengthen DBT

It seems only appropriate to take exception to the false, wrongful and egregious statements of the Dishonorable Peter B. Lyons on issues of security that he delivered at the 21st Annual Regulatory Information Conference held on March 10, 2009. It's appropriate, as again this year when the Commissioners had opportunity to side with human health and public safety in strengthening the DBT (Design Basis Threat), the commissioners ended up in a 2-2 tie, which amounts to voting in favor of their licensees, even though that vote has needlessly and wrongfully placed Host Communities here in America at grave risk.

For ease of separation, my comments have been interspersed with Peter Lyon's statements, mine appearing in red. It is time that National Security take a front seat to corporate nuclear profits...we have learned that much in the melt down of both Wall Street, and the Banking Industry, the governments inept enforcement failures never more noticeable than the Financial Nuclear Explosion at AIG that has devastated communities across America, wrecking our economy, ruining the retirement opportunities for tens of millions in the Boomer Generation.

Sadly, the NRC's incestuous relationship with the industry through NEI, the Commissioners own financial inbreeding with the nuclear industry (many within the NRC hold stock/investments in various companies and/or funds that are tied to the nuclear industry and the people they are supposed to be policing) they have taken an oath to protect us against has put every reactor community in America in grave risk of suffering a fate far worse than the collapse of our economy visited upon 12.5 million Main Street Americans. It is imperative that Obama demand investigations, and where appropriate, bring criminal charges against at least two board members on the commission. Since the NRC's own Office of Inspector General seems to have become corrupt, I am calling on Congress to name a Special Prosecutor to carry out a full and complete criminal investigation of the NRC, NEI and EPRI, and if possible give said investigator authorization to broaden the investigation to include both the DOE and the DOD.

Building for the Future in a Time of Change

The Honorable Peter B. Lyons
Commissioner
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

21st Annual Regulatory Information Conference
March 10, 2009

Nuclear Reactor Security (Peter's Entire Speech)

In response to the events of 9/11, the last several years have witnessed an increased focus on the security of nuclear reactors as well as the secure use of nuclear materials. With all due respect Commissioner Peter's, not sure giving lip service to nuclear reactor security issues since 9/11 is the same as what you falsely allege in stating, "...an increased focus on the security of nuclear reactors...". There are specific examples where the NRC, where the Commissioners have gone against their own staff recommendations, gone against findings of the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, have actually weakened the DBT to a point where it provides fewer protections than we as a host community were afforded before 9/11. Over the last four years, the force-on-force program has progressed well, as all the parties – from licensees, to the adversary force, to the NRC – have learned and improved their responses. Again exception is taken...first, every single Reactor Host Community and various stakeholders within those community have objected to numerous inadequacies in the DBT, taken exception with the way the force on force exercises are run. Most importantly, we have objected to a DBT and Force on Force exercises designed to assure passing grades are received at every licensed reactor site, regardless of the known significant security problems that exist at most sites...sleeping guards, over worked security personnel (due to a WORSENING qualified worker shortage that has reached epidemic proportions in the industry, and at NRC Headquarters as well...the average worker or guard at a nuclear reactor site is putting in a SEVENTY HOUR WORK WEEK each and every single week of the year, vacation times often being discouraged) and breachable outer security perimeters that can easily be breached by terrorist. The role played by active duty Special Operations Forces personnel has been vital in development of scenarios and evaluation of the adversary force. While I had great skepticism with the decision made before my arrival to have the Nuclear Energy Institute, or NEI, hire the Composite Adversary Force or CAF, my personal observations of the results of this arrangement have convinced me that the NRC, with the help of those extremely dedicated Special Operations Forces personnel, has complete control of the vital attributes of the exercises. I shall simply say this about the conflict of interest that exists in letting the nuclear industry's lobbyist put together the Force on Force teams, and I say it in the form of a formal allegation...on good authority, it is my belief that some if not all NEI Composite Adversary Force members were brought up to the NEI from the security forces at Nuclear Reactor facilities, and their paychecks are being written out on the accounts of reactor licensees. More importantly, it has been stated within the Stakeholder Community that one two Commissioners are aware of the fact that Force on Force Team Members are being paid by their licensees. Though this cannot be validated, looking at the 2-2 vote, it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out who VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE LICENSEES, IN FAVOR OF A DANGEROUSLY WATERED DOWN DBT.

Thus, when the Commission considered alternatives to the NEI CAF contract, I felt comfortable continuing the previous arrangement, as opposed to bringing the CAF function into the agency. I would ask Mr. Lyons where his level of comfort comes from if he truly takes his oath to protect human health and the environment serriously. You are fine with the conflict of interest that exists in your licensees lobbyist TESTTING THEM? You are comfortable knowing licensees are paying the salaries of the Force On Force team members? You are comfortabgle knowing that Force On Force Team members have come up from the ranks, and are close friends with the people they are going to be testing...we have heard NUMEROUS REPORTS that guards are getting calls at their homes affording them A HEADS UP. A large part of my decision was based on my recognition that the NRC really is not an ideal home for the CAF. As a practical matter, the NRC is not well positioned to rotate a licensee’s personnel on and off the CAF. NEI, on the other hand, is able to work with licensees to rotate guards from various sites onto the CAF and then back to the sites. It is pointed out here, that this above sentence actually PROVES THE ALLEGATIONS that I am making. My decision was strongly influenced by the recognition that when personnel move from the CAF back to a site, they are returning with new knowledge and perspectives that further improve site security. They are returning with a CHEAT SHEET, have been given the answers to the test to share with their fellow members of the Security Team when they return to their home reactor site.

The NRC’s Design Basis Threat, or DBT, also underwent several modifications during my tenure. I’ve noted before, that because we face an evolving threat, I don’t believe the Commission can ever guarantee a constant DBT. We are not asking for a CONSTANT DBT, but one that keeps us safe. As one example, it is pointed out, that before 9/11 occurred, the DBT required protection against a explosvie laden truck the size of the one used in the first WTC Terrorist attack. However, after 9/11 when your licensee's found out they could not protect their reactors from said explosives laden truck, the explosive laden truck was reduced down in size to a SMALL SUV. However, we can and should assure that any proposed changes are studied in a careful and consistent process. To that end, the Commission supported a procedure that enables staff analysis of intelligence information to inform any potential changes to the DBT. The staff follows a rigorous examination of any new potential attribute, which includes evaluation of the extent to which an element of the integrated capabilities of our local, state, or federal authorities is already working to address a specific threat. This sounds impressive in a delivered Speech Mr. Lyons, but is completely opposite of the on the ground reality at the NRC...on too many occassions, after PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH NEI and YOUR LICENSEES, you have gone against the recommendations of your staff that so deligently studied the situation , so carefully made their recommendations in the best interest of human health and public safety. Again, as example I offer the case of the high powered 50 caliber rifle that your staff said should in the DBT (along with an extensive list of other weapons that the FBI, DHS and various law enforcement agencies said were easily attainable). The Commissioners after PRIVATE CONSULTATON with the NEI who argued COST, the DBT was GUTTED. It is pointed out here, that the primary reason the 50 Caliber was removed from the list was almost all reactor sites and their guard towers and control rooms have Bullet Resistent Glass, and inclusion of the 50 Caliber Rifle would have required them to install BULLET PROOF GLASS. Interesting enough, and cited as proof of the Commissioners illegal activities, it is pointed out that the reason given for taking this weapon off of the DBT list was) "it's not an easily attainable weapon." Not true...in fact, you could call it standard issue for gangs, drug lords and terrorist alike. In addition, if an attribute is added, we need to provide licensees with an appropriate time for implementation. What do you consider adequate time when it comes to protecting human health and safety? We routinely see you giving licensees ten year extensions to do MANDATORY inspections, watched stunned as your staff issues Generic Letter after Generic Letter excusing EVERY REACTOR OWNER from the regulations of 10 CFR because none of your liensees can meet the regulations for such reasons as THE PARTS ARE NO LONGER MADE...yet, you are extending licenses for 20 more years and carrying over 3000 exemptions into the new license renewals against YOUR OWN REGULATIONS.

Over the last four years, increased cooperation among Federal, state, and local agencies has further enhanced the security of our nation’s power plants. How so? Your own staff sat at the first License Renewal Meeting for Entergy's Indian Point and admitted in a significant incident or terrorist attack that our Evactuation Plan WILL NOT WORK...you intend on ordering us to Shelter in Place even though the 40 percent level of protection afforded by Sheltering In Place is inadequate protection of PUBLIC HEALTH according to your own 10 CFR Regulations. Can you explain to the Host Communities who gave you permission to commit Nuclear Genocide against a Host Community by giving such an order? The comprehensive reviews conducted by the Department of Homeland Security are a prime example of this involvement by other agencies. In addition, we’ve initiated hazard-based drills that exercise a wide range of off-site response elements with particular stress on interoperability of communications. It is pointed out here, that you have INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE and EQUIPMENT to deal with a serious nuclear incident AT ANY OF YOUR REACTOR SITES...in fact, I know first hand, that here in Westchester County you currently have the ability to wash off radioactive contaminants at the rate of 200 people an hour under PERFECT CONDITIONS...do the math for say 500,000 people Mr. Lyons. Do people exposed to radioactive particulates falling frm the sky have 2500 hours to wash the crap off of themselves? That's what...little over three months! Care to share with EVERY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY the fact that you only have the abiltity to safely evacuate to Approved Shelter facilities 20 percent of the population. I know these figures to be true, as I have friends that are approved FIRST RESPONDERS. The agency and licensees are also conducting imminent threat drills. These drills utilize the real-time information exchange we’ve developed with the North American Aerospace Defense Command to identify any airborne threat, along with detailed modeling of all domestic plants to determine the steps necessary to place a plant into the safest possible configuration prior to any potential impact. With all due respect, care to share with your readers how long it takes to scrabble say three F16's...I know already. Care to admit to the general public around say Indian Point that there is nothing the NRC, DOD or DHS can do if a plane is hijacked at Stewart or Westchester County Airports and flow directly at our nuclear facility? If you would like, I am more than happy to get my digital camera out here and film some of the large planes that are regularly flying almost directly over Indian Point. In addition, we recently conducted a pilot of an Integrated Comprehensive Exercise at Limerick, which enabled federal, state, and local forces to work together. Taken together, the wide range of exercises that have been conducted demonstrates the incredibly robust security at domestic nuclear plants. WOW....your 40 security guards can protect against a force on force team that consists of THREE PEOPLE! How many people were involved in 9/11? By the way, did you know it is possible to take out most nuclear reactors without even going onto the facility grounds? Have you seen the ammuniction available for a 50 caliber rifle...care to discuss the shoulder launched mortats that you also took off the DBT list there Mr. Lyons? I know, lets talk about the new fully automatic 12 gauge...if you like I can post up pictures of this weapon and its munitions that is easily found online.

In addition to these safety measures, the agency has devoted more attention to mitigating effects of an aircraft impact. Regulations now require each nuclear plant to develop the capability to deal with large fires and explosions. In addition, through a rulemaking finalized by the Commission last month, new requirements are in place for all new plants to assure that they meet specific performance requirements after an impact HOW can you stand up before your peers and LIE....you have WEAKENED fire regulations because none of your licensees could meet the regulations....care to state how long the crew has to run through and shut down the entire facility....want to talk about the failing coatings on wires during a fire? I know...how about we discuss the poisonous fume issues once those coatings start melting. What about debris blocking the discharge canal? Even a small plane can take out the spent fuel pools at Indian Point, a large Boeing 747 wiping out how many hundreds of thousands once the spent fuel fires began? Want to talk about the back up diesel generators? At Indian Point ALL DIESEL GENERATORS for both reactors are in the same building...even worse...reactors two and three are bothing claiming use of THE SAME BACK UP GENERATOR.

Be honest Mr. Lyons...the Commissioners are too nuclear reactors what the FDIC, FED and the SEC were to Wall Street and the Banks, and if you think we in America's Host Communities hould feel good about that, you are sadly mistaken. What is truly sad, is America will not wake up to the truth we speak until there is a significant nuclear accident or terrorist attack at one of these aged facilities, and you and your fellow commissioners have decided you are willing to play Russian Roulette with our lives in the name of a Nuclear Renaissance.

Winston Strawn-Aircraft Impacts

USS Hartford In Near Nuclear Tragedy! 15 CREW HAVE BEEN INJURED

BREAKING NEWS...FOX, CNN...Nuclear Submarine USS HARTFORD RAMS another American Naval Ship...FIFTEEN NAVY SAILORS ARE INJURED. From Washington Scandal!

Friday, March 20, 2009

USS Hartford Nuclear Submarine Narrowing Escapes TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES in Straight Of Hormuz....UPDATE

Just in...BREAKING NEWS....CNN Makes it Official....The USS HARTFORD has been involved in a MAJOR COLLISION with another naval vessel in the Straight of Hormuz injuring 15 sailors on board! US MILITARY narrowing DODGES disaster on the high seas, nuclear catastrophes of the most horrific kind. More details as they become known. As is too be expected, the NAVY is mitigating the available news on this SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR INCIDENT to protect the military/commercial nuclear industry push towards a Nuclear Renaissance...it should be noted, that there is a certain REVOLVING DOOR where former sailors in the Nuclear Navy are moved into positions with NEI, NRC, or at one of America's 104 pathetically maintained Commercial Reactors.

USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) LINKS

USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - SubNet HARTFORD stats and photo page. [ www.subnet.com/fleet/ssn768.htm ]
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - NavSource Submarine Photo Archive.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - HARTFORD Navy Vessel Register web page; homeport Groton, CT.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - press release about the christening of USS HARTFORD, December 3, 1993, Navy Office of Information.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - press release about the commissioning of USS HARTFORD, December 9, 1994, Navy Office of Information.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - the NavySite.de HARTFORD page.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - U.S. Navy sacks commander, crew after nuclear submarine rams seabed off Italy - FreeRepublic.com, November 12, 2003.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - a Neohumanism.org HARTFORD page.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - Military.com submarine HARTFORD Homepage; Buddies, Reunions, Messages, Histories; you have to do the email/password thing, what else is new?
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - an official Navy CSG2 HARTFORD page with command, address, stats, history.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - a boilerplate .pdf file; the COMSUBLANT HARTFORD Fact Sheet has a short writeup, CO info and some specs.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - USS HARTFORD Details, Systems, Photos, Profiles, Patches by Combatindex.com.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - a Wikipedia.org HARTFORD page.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - a USSVI Ship's Profile page w/Classification, Characteristics, Key Dates, Reunion/Association, Crew Lists (available on DeckLog), History, Internet Associations and Reunions, Photo and Patch.
USS HARTFORD (SSN-768) - an identical page to the USSVI page above by Decklog.com.

Qualified Workers Threatening Safety of Reactor Host Community


A ever worsening worker shortage in the American Nuclear Industry sees the NRC willingly putting host communities at HIGH RISK to Human Error Accidents in the name of Reactor Owner profits. On an almost daily basis all across the nation episodes of sleeping Control Room staff, exhausted guards, and overly worked Maintenance and Inspection crews are being swept under the carpet as the NRC attempts to hide this troubling reality from Host Communities.

Imagine workers at these CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE locations, because of worker shortages putting in 60-70 hours week in and week out as their exhaustion builds, as their mental crispness WANES. The average American worker puts in just under 2100 hours a year, while the NRC and its licensees expect over worked and under paid staff to put in (on average)almost 3700 hours on a yearly basis. Tired minds make mistakes...human error caused the Reactor Melt Downs at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island here in America.

Ask yourself host communities...can you afford the risks the nuclear industry is exposing you to in OVER WORKING their staffs because of greed? Has the time come to demand work weeks for all employees at Nuclear Facilities (including guard staff) to not work more than a 48 hour week (notice this still allows Nuclear Reactor sites to have employees working reasonable over time hours. Not only would such a NRC Rule Change be good from a SAFETY PERSPECTIVE, but it would add on average 700 new employees at most reactor sites, which in turn will BOOST Host Community economies and tax bases.

Amid nuclear worker shortage, FPL says it's following rules

jdorschner@MiamiHerald.com

Five times since 2000, operators of U.S. nuclear power plants have been found slumped over their controls asleep, according to federal documents.

The suspected reason each time: exhaustion from long stretches of overtime. The problem is that there's a shortage of nuclear operators -- in Florida and across the country. A lawsuit filed recently by 20 nuclear operators at Turkey Point complained that on average most of them work ''60 to 70 hours or more'' a week.

In the first six weeks of of 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission found that Florida Power & Light's nuclear plants had 21 overtime ''deviations'' in which 17 plant operators had worked more than 72 hours a week, the maximum now allowed. Two of those workers were involved in a spill of 200 gallons of boric acid used to control the nuclear reaction in the core, but there was no indication from the NRC on whether fatigue could have caused the error.

FPL says it complies with all federal requirements concerning overtime and is working hard to develop more nuclear operators. ''At each of our nuclear sites, FPL carefully tracks the hours worked by our operators to ensure compliance with NRC work hour requirements,'' says FPL spokesman Tom Veenstra.




  • FOXNews.com - Feds: 7 Guards Caught Sleeping at Tenn. Nuclea...

    Jan 16, 2008 ... Nuclear Weapons Plant, Seven guards caught sleeping at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge since 2000, a federal spokesman says.

    www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,323345,00.html - 47k - Similar pages

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  • Nuclear Plant Guards Caught Sleeping On The Job - cbs3.com

    Sep 26, 2007 ... Major security changes are underway at an area nuclear plant following the discovery of several guards sleeping on the job.

    cbs3.com/local/Nuclear.Plant.Peach.2.312072.html - 52k - Similar pages

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  • ABC News: Sleeping Security Guards Cost Nuclear Plant $65000

    The operators of a Pennsylvania nuclear power plant have been fined $65000 after a federal commission learned several security guards at the facility were ...

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  • Video of Sleeping Guards Shakes Nuclear Industry

    Jan 4, 2008 ... Video of Sleeping Guards Shakes Nuclear Industry - The Huffington Post.

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  • Digg - Nuclear plant guards caught sleeping on the job

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  • Thursday, March 19, 2009

    Anti Gravity News, Or Skunk Works Update...

    The fine folks over at Rock The Reactors passed along an interesting bit of email that I thought I would share with my readers...though still waiting for them to find us. All in good time. How many of you are familiar with Lockheed's Skunk Works? Antigravity? UFO's? Does not matter, enjoy the read...waving at William.



    Hello all,

    We know antigrav tech has been developed by Lockheed Skunk Works and is locked away in "black op" projects:

    http://www.examiner.com/x-2383-Honolulu-Exopolitics-Examiner~y2009m3d4-Presidential-Directive-opens-door-for-release-of-antigravity-technology






    General Jones & President Obama shaking hands at
    Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N.C.Photo: AP

    On February 13, 2009, President Obama released his first National Security Directive. Titled Presidential Policy Directive -1, it greatly expands the power of the National Security Council (NSC) to oversee all executive departments and agencies. The Directive introduces new members into top level NSC meetings including the Energy Secretary and the U.S. representative to the United Nations. Most significant is that Obama’s National Security Advisor, General James Jones (ret.), was given direct authority to develop and implement policy throughout the NSC system. Under previous Presidential administrations, a number of interagency committees were not chaired or controlled by the NSC. “Under Obama”, according to one Foreign Policy analyst, “the NSC chairs everything, though some committees can and will be cochaired.” Prior to his current appointment, General Jones was involved in a secretive Boeing Corporation effort to declassify antigravity technology for commercial application. Boeing’s declassification efforts were denied. Obama’s Directive now gives General Jones a second opportunity to have antigravity technology declassified for commercial development.


    Classified antigravity technologies have been kept from the public realm for over six decades while secretly developed by military-corporate entities. It was revealed in 1992, for example, that the B-2 Bomber used electrostatic charges on its leading wings and exhaust. According to aerospace experts, this was confirmation that the B-2 used electrogravitic principles based on the Biefeld-Brown Effect. The Biefeld-Brown Effect is based on the research of Thomas Townsend Brown who in 1928 gained a patent for his practical application of how high voltage electrostatic charges can reduce the weight of objects. The B-2 bomber employs sufficiently high voltages to significantly reduce its weight. This enables the B-2 and other classified antigravity vehicles to display flight characteristics that appear to defy conventional laws of physics. The idea that advanced antigravity technologies exist and have been developed by military-corporate entities is supported by the former CEO for Lockheed Skunk works. Ben Rich said:



    We already have the means to travel among the stars, but these technologies are locked up in black projects and it would take an act of God to ever get them out to benefit humanity.. anything you can imagine we already know how to do.


    Watch this video:
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQqkQdQrsC8


    While a Presidential Directive is not quite an "act of God", it may be enough to open the door for the release of antigravity technology. Especially so given the background of the man given the responsibility to run the NSC - former Marine Commandant, General Jim Jones.


    After retiring from the Marines on February 1, 2007, General Jones served on the Board of Directors of the Boeing Corporation from June 21, 2007 to December 15, 2008. Boeing had been active at least since the early 1990’s in studies to apply antigravity technology for commercial use. In 2002, an internal Boeing project called “Gravity Research for Advanced Space Propulsion” (GRASP) had been disclosed to the aerospace industry. A GRASP briefing document obtained by Jane’s Defense Weekly stated Boeing’s position:



    If gravity modification is real, it will alter the entire aerospace business.


    According to a 2008 book by Dr Paul LaViolette, Secrets of Antigravity Technology, Boeing completed a separate classified study for the U.S. military of electrogravitic propulsion recently before October 2007. Boeing was rebuffed in its efforts to have such technology declassified and released into the public sector. As a Board Director and member of Boeing’s Finance Committee at the time of the 2007 classified study, General Jones was privy to and supported Boeing’s efforts in antigravity research and development. The governmental entity that rebuffed Boeing efforts was very likely an interagency committee that was not under the direct control of the NSC at the time of the Bush administration. This has been part of a historic trend in which antigravity and other highly advanced technologies have been increasingly placed under the control of corporate entities as trade secrets.The most practical way of reversing this historic trend is to increase the power of the NSC and ensure it has direct oversight over all interagency committees. This is precisely what Presidential Policy Directive -1 makes possible.


    General Jones' authority under Obama’s first Presidential Directive, places him in a strong position to ensure that new energy ideas such as antigravity propulsion become integrated into a comprehensive national security policy. He can now ensure that the NSC takes direct oversight over all parts of the NSC system. Jones will then be able to exercize his authority over corporate entities involved in joint research and development projects with government agencies and military departments. This could not come at a better time given the present economic difficulties in the U.S. and the world. The release of antigravity and other advanced technologies will spur financial investment and development in ways that can greatly stimulate the global economy. This may lead to a signficant behind the scenes power struggle between Obama's enhanced NSC and elements of the corporate sector. Jones appears to be the right person to succesfully head Obama's NSC during such a struggle. The first 100 days of the Obama administration promises much progress towards the commercial release and development of antigravity technologies.








    --

    I will be showing a startling video of my replication of the Boyd Bushman antigrav experiment at the upcoming conference the end of May:
    http://ufoskywatch.com/

    Bill

    ---
    William S. Alek, Chief Director, President
    PROGRESSIVE TECH CENTER, INC.
    7760 E. State Rte 69, Ste C5-381
    Prescott Valley, AZ 86314
    PHONE: 928.255.0198
    URL:
    http://progressivetechcenter.org/

    Monday, March 16, 2009

    The Helen Keller Brain Salad Directed Energy Sandwich Nuclear Comparison

    America's Nuclear Reactors are perhaps some of the most critical infrastructure in America, and also some of the most poorly guarded...as example, the NEI was successful in convincing the NRC that Bullet Resistence Glass was fine when weighed with what it would cost the Licensees to upgrade their guard towers! (About $10 million per reactor site on a one time investment basis.)

    That might sound like a lot of money, the industry position reasonable until you take a look at the DOD and their Directed Energy Directorate located at the Phillips Research Site, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The Directorate has a workforce of more than 600 people, an annual budget exceeding $130 million, and 670,000 square feet of working space. What do they do? Look for ways to blind large groups of protesters with pulse weapons while they turn your brains into egg salad. (Right now, they are looking to control the lazer pulses enough that they do not do permanent eye damage. Take Microwave oven doors to your next Anti Nuclear sit in to make a group shield with.)


    The Advanced Optics & Imaging Division develops techniques and technologies to improve optical systems, and then transition those systems to war-fighting commands. The Division also is working on systems that will accurately place a beam of laser light on a target such as an attacking missile. Much of this research is in support of the Air Force's Airborne Laser program.

    The High-Power Microwave Division is the Air Force's center of excellence for high-power microwave technologies, managing all research and development in that area. This includes high-power microwave hardware and systems, as well as protection against an aggressor's microwave systems.

    The Laser Division is the Department of Defense's center of expertise for the development of lasers and for getting those technologies to U.S. military forces. Included are semiconductor, gas, chemical, and solid-state lasers.

    The Optical Surveillance Division provides research and development for leading-edge space capabilities to enhance the United States' space mission.

    The Starfire Optical Range Division operates a facility that includes a 3.5-meter telescope, one of the largest in the world able to image satellites passing quickly overhead. The facility also uses lasers and adaptive optics as part of its research for obtaining high-resolution images of objects in space.

    The Program Integration Division assesses potential applications and effects of systems incorporating directed energy technologies. The Division also manages the strategic development of the Directed Energy Directorate.